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Abstract
Unlike the standard assumption that the degree of impatience, measured by
the rate of time preference, is increasing in wealth, empirical studies support
that impatience is marginally decreasing. By introducing decreasing marginal
impatience into the neoclassical monetary growth model á la Sidrauski, we
show that (i) consistently with empirical results, an increase in the core rate
of inflation reduces capital stocks in a steady state; and that (ii) its long-run
welfare cost is larger than predicted with increasing or constant marginal
impatience, implying that estimates of the inflation cost which have so far
been obtained by assuming constant time preference may be underestimates.
Keywords: Decreasing marginal impatience, time preference, inflation, the
Tobin effect
JEL classification: D90, E00.
1 Introduction
In the theory of endogenous time preference, one of the most controversial
assumptions is that the degree of impatience, measured by the rate of time
preference, is marginally increasing in wealth. Although existing empirical
studies, e.g., Lawrance (1991), Becker and Mulligan (1997), Samwick (1997),
and Barsky et. al. (1997), commonly report that the degree of impatience
is marginally decreasing in wealth or income, few research has so far been
conducted on implications of decreasing marginal impatience. This contrasts
to the huge accumulation of research on increasing marginal impatience (see,
e.g., Epstein (1987)). The main reason for this is that marginal decreas-
ing impatience ceteris paribus destabilizes optimal consumption dynamics.
However, Das (2003) and Hirose and Ikeda (2004) recently show that, even
with decreasing marginal impatience, equilibrium economic dynamics can be
stable in neoclassical growth models where capital input displays decreas-
ing return. By using the resulting, dynamically well-behaved model, it is of
particular importance to work out policy implications of decreasing marginal
impatience.
By introducing decreasing marginal impatience into the neoclassical mon-
etary growth model á la Sidrauski (1967), the purpose of this exercise is
to re-examine the real effects of an increase in the core rate of inflation.
Many empirical studies have reported that inflation harms capital accumula-
tion (e.g., Fischer (1993), De Gregorio (1992), Barro (1995), and Jones and
Manuelli (1995)). Theoretical studies, however, have shown different results
since Tobin (1965) claimed that inflation enlarges capital and production in
the long run by causing portfolio shifting away from real money balances
to real capital. Especially Epstein and Hynes (1983) reproduced the Tobin
effect by using a general equilibrium model with endogenous time prefer-
ence.1 However, the result might depend crucially on their assumption that
impatience is marginally increasing.
With decreasing marginal impatience, we indeed show that, consistently
with the empirical stylized fact, a higher inflation rate results in smaller long-
run capital stocks. Intuitively, higher inflation reduces real money balances,
1The Tobin effect has been also obtained by using overlapping generations models
(e.g., Weil (1991)). The Tobin effect in these models is associated with the nonneutral-
ity of debts, which differs from Tobin’s argument. Introducing explicitly a transaction-
facilitating function of money (e.g., Stockman (1981)) weakens the validity of the Tobin
effect. For a survey, see Orphanides and Solow (1990).
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which raises the steady-state time preference and hence the real interest rate
under decreasing marginal impatience. The long-run capital stock should
thus be reduced.
As an important welfare implication, it is also shown that the resulting
long-run welfare cost of inflation is larger than predicted with increasing or
constant marginal impatience. If actual time preference displays decreasing
marginal impatience as empirically reported, the result implies that misspec-
ifying impatience as marginally increasing or constant leads to underestimat-
ing the long-run welfare costs of inflation. For example, by using constant
time preference models, Jones and Manuelli (1995) and Lucas (2000) report
that the welfare cost of inflation is quantitatively very modest. They may,
however, underestimate the actual values.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a mone-
tary growth model with decreasing marginal impatience. Section 3 examines
the effects of inflation on capital accumulation. Section 4 concludes the pa-
per.
2 The model with decreasing marginal impa-
tience
We consider an infinitely-lived representative agent in the “money-in-the-
utility-function” framework. He or she holds wealth a in the form of real
capital k and real money balances m; supplies one unit of labor inelastically;
and maximizes lifetime utility by choosing the time profiles of consumption
c, real money balances, and the real capital stock. His or her problem is
specified as follows:
(1) max
Z ∞
0
u (ct,mt) exp(−∆t)dt,
subject to:
(2) ∆˙t = δ (u (ct,mt)) ,∆0 = 0,
(3) a˙t = rtat + wt − ct − (rt + πt)mt + xt, at ≥ 0,
at = kt +mt, kt > 0, k0 = given,
2
where a dot represents the time derivative; u (•, •) represents the felicity func-
tion; ∆ denotes a cumulative discount rate with the instantaneous discount
rate δ (u) á la Uzawa (1968): ∆t =
R t
0
δ (uτ)dτ ; r the real rate of interest;
w the wage rate; π the rate of inflation; and x lump-sum transfer payments
from the government.
For intertemporal preferences to be well-defined, we follow the literature
(e.g., Epstein (1987, p.75)) in assuming that the following standard regularity
conditions are valid: (C1) u < 0; (C2) u is increasing and concave; (C3) u is
log-convex; and (C4) δ (u (c,m)) is concave in (c,m).
In contrast to the existing literature (e.g., Uzawa (1968) and Epstein
(1987)), we assume that δ0 (u) < 0, for which case, as shown later, the degree
of impatience, measured by the pure rate of time preference is marginally
decreasing in wealth.2
Let λ and φ represent the current-value shadow prices for savings and
the discount factor Ω = exp (−∆), respectively. Let g (c,m,φ) represent
generating function u (c,m)− φδ (u (c,m)). Then, the marginal utilities are
given by first derivatives gc and gm, where gc ≡ ∂g/∂c, etc. It is assumed
that gc and gm are all positive.3 4For analytical simplicity, we also assume
that c and m are separable: gcm = 0.5
The optimal consumption should satisfy:
(4) gc (ct,φt) = λt,
(5) χ(ct,mt) ≡
um (ct,mt)
uc (ct,mt)
= rt + πt,
2Das (2003) proposes an alternative set of regularity conditions in which ∂δ/∂c < 0
itself is imposed as a part of the regurality condition. Our main result below does not
change at all even when we adopt his regularity conditions, instead of conditions (C1)
through (C4).
3This assumption is necessary because, from regularity condition (C1), φ, which equals
the utility index as shown later, is negative. Since φ equals u/δ in steady state, the
positivity of gc and gm is satisfied near the steady-state point only when the elasticity of
the discount rate δ with respect to felicity u is smaller than unity: uδ0/δ < 1. Similar
assumptions are needed in the case of increasing marginal impatience when u is assumed
to be positive (see, e.g., Uzawa (1968) and Gootzeit et al (2002)).
4If we adopted Das’s regurality conditions, instead of our conditions (C1) through (C4),
the positivity of gc and gm would be ensured. But, unlike what we do later, we could not
consider the case of increasing marginal impatience under the Das regurality conditions in
which δ0 < 0 is imposed as a regurality condition.
5The separability gcm = 0 is satisfied when u and δ are both separable, ucm = 0 and
δcm = 0.
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(6) λ˙t = (δ (u (ct,mt))− rt)λt,
(7) φ˙t = −g (ct,mt,φt) ,
and the transversality conditions. Note that the optimal φt equals the lifetime
utility obtained from the optimal consumption stream after time t, as can
be seen by solving differential equation (7) under transversality condition
limt→∞ exp (−∆t)φt∆t = 0.
Define the rate of time preference ρ as ρ (c,m,φ) ≡ −d lnΓt/dt|c˙=0 , where
Γ ≡ gc (c,φ) exp (−∆) represents the present-value marginal utility of c.6
Differentiate (4) and (5) by t and substitute the results into (6) to obtain:
(8)
c˙t
ct
= − gc (ct,φt)
cgcc (ct,φt)
(rt − ρ (ct,mt,φt)) ,
(9)
m˙t
mt
= − gm (mt,φt)
mgmm (mt,φt)
(r − ρ(ct,mt,φt)).
where
ρ (ct,mt,φt) = δ (u (ct,mt))−
δ0 (u (ct,mt))
1− φδ0 (u (ct,mt))
g (ct,mt,φt) .
Money is supplied by the government in the form of “helicopter money:”
(10) µmt = xt,
where µ denotes the growth rate of nominal money supply.
Goods are produced by competitive firms with a constant-to-scale tech-
nology. Let f denote a per capita production function satisfying fk > 0 and
fkk < 0. From the profit-maximizing behavior of firms, r and w are given as
(11) wt = f (kt)− ktfk (kt) ; rt = fk (kt) .
By substituting equations (10) and (11) into (3), we obtain
(12) k˙t = f (kt)− ct.
6The rate of time preference can also be defined by using the marginal utility of real
money balances. Due to weak separability of the Uzawa-type intertemporal preferences,
however, the time preferece rate with respect to m equals that with respect to c. For the
detailed discussions, see Shi (1994).
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Equations (3) through (12) jointly determine the equilibrium dynamics
for (at, ct, kt,mt, rt, wt, , xt,λt,φt) . The steady-state solution (c
∗,m∗, k∗,φ∗) is
determined by
δ (u (c∗,m∗)) = fk(k
∗),
(13) χ(c∗,m∗) = fk(k∗) + µ,
f (k∗) = c∗,
φ∗ =
u (c∗,m∗)
fk(k∗)
.
To obtain a linearized autonomous dynamic system, combine m˙/m =
µ− π with (5) and (9) to get
gm
mtgmm
(ρ(ct,mt,φt)− fk(kt)) = µ+ fk(kt)− χ(ct,mt),
which can be solved for mt as
(14) mt = υ(ct,φt, kt;µ).
From (11) and (14), the dynamic equations (7), (8), and (12) then reduce to:
c˙t = −
gc (ct,φt)
gcc (ct,φt)
(fk(kt)− ρ (ct, υ(ct,φt, kt;µ),φt)) ,
(15) φ˙t = −g (ct, υ(ct,φt, kt;µ),φt) ,
k˙t = f (kt)− ct.
Letting z represent (c,φ, k)0, this dynamic system can be linearized around
the steady state as z˙t = A (zt − z∗);
A =


0 rδ
0uc
gcc
− gc
gcc
fkk
−gc − gm(−χmχc ) r − gm(−
rδ0um
mgmmχm
) −gm(fkkχm +
gm
mgmmχm
fkk)
−1 0 r

 ,
where the coefficient matrix A is evaluated at the steady-state point.
The steady-state equilibrium point is locally saddle-point stable if and
only if det (A) < 0 and trace (A) > 0, for which case matrix A has two
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positive and one negative characteristic roots. It can be easily shown that
the saddle-point stability condition is satisfied if and only if
Λ ≡ (1− χ χc
χm
)rδ0uc − fkk +
χ
χm
δ0ucfkk > 0,
2r +
gmrδ
0um
mgmmχm
> 0.
In what follows, these conditions are assumed to be met.7 8
3 The effect of inflation
Let us now examine the effect of a permanent increase in the core rate of
inflation µ. From (13), the steady-state equilibrium is determined by
(16) δ (u (f (k∗) ,m∗)) = fk(k∗),
(17) χ(f (k∗) ,m∗) = fk(k∗) + µ.
Figure 1 depicts the determination, where schedule DD0 represents (16)
and MM 0 (17). The MM 0 schedule is positively sloping and, under the as-
sumption that Λ is positive, the slope of the DD0 schedule is also positive but
gentler than that ofMM 0. The steady-state equilibrium is determined at the
intersection of the two schedules. An increase in µ shifts the MM 0 schedule
upward, bringing the steady state point from E0 to E1. As illustrated, the
steady state capital stock decreases in response to the rise in the inflation
rate. In fact, from (16) and (17), we can derive
(18)
dk∗
dµ
= −δ
0um
χmΛ
< 0.
7We have
det (A) =
gm
gccχm
rδ0ucfkk +
gcr
gcc
·
(1− gm
gc
χc
χm
)rδ0uc − fkk
¸
,
trace (A) = 2r +
gmrδ0um
mgmmχm
.
It can easily be shown that det (A) < 0⇔ Λ > 0.
8It is a standard procedure to assume saddle-point stability for comparative dynamics.
See, e.g., Heijdra (1998).
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Intuitively, higher inflation reduces real money holdings, which, under
decreasing marginal impatience, ceteris paribus raises the discount rate and
hence the interest rate in the steady state. This reduces the capital stock
in the long run. This result contrasts to the case of increasing marginal
impatience, in which case (16) is depicted as negatively sloped as illustrated
as schedule II 0 in Figure 1, so that the increase in µ enlarges k∗ as illustrated
by the movement from E0 to E2.
Proposition 1: When impatience is marginally decreasing, an increase in
the core rate of inflation reduces the capital stock.
Remark: As seen from (18), whether an increase in µ increases or decreases
k∗ depends crucially on the sign of ∂δ/∂m (= δ0um in present case), but not
on ∂δ/∂c, that is on whether impatience with respect to m is marginally
increasing or decreasing, but not on whether impatience with respect to c
is marginally increasing or decreasing. When δ depends directly on (c,m)
independently of u, and hence when preferences are weakly non-separable
in the sense of Shi (1994), the same result as in Proposition 1 can be valid
even if impatience is marginally increasing in c, insofar as it is marginally
decreasing in m.
From (13), jointly with the decrease in k∗, steady-state consumption is
also reduced. Since consumption and real money balances decrease and hence
the discount rate rises in the long run, the steady-state welfare level φ∗ is
definitely lowered. Note that the new steady-state point E1, obtained under
decreasing marginal impatience, is located in the south-west to, and hence
dominated by, point E2, attained under increasing marginal impatience. This
implies that the long-run welfare deterioration caused by an increase in µ is
larger than it would when impatience is marginally increasing. More pre-
cisely, we have u (c∗,m∗)|point E1 < u (c∗,m∗)|point E2 and fk (k∗)|point E1 >
fk (k
∗)|point E2 , so that, from (13), φ∗|point E1 (= u (c∗,m∗) /fk (k∗)|point E1) is
smaller than φ∗|point E2 (= u (c∗,m∗) /fk (k∗)|point E2). Similarly it is easy to
see that the long-run welfare deterioration is also larger than it would under
constant marginal impatience.
Proposition 2: The long-run welfare cost of inflation under decreasing mar-
ginal impatience is larger than predicted with increasing or constant marginal
impatience.
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If actual time preference displays decreasing marginal impatience as often
empirically reported, Proposition 2 implies that estimates of the welfare cost
of inflation which are obtained by using models of increasing or constant
marginal impatience are underestimates of the actual cost. For example, by
using constant time preference models, Jones and Manuelli (1995) and Lucas
(2000) obtain quantitatively very modest estimates for the welfare cost of
inflation. They may, however, underestimate the actual costs.
4 Conclusions
By introducing decreasing marginal impatience into a neoclassical monetary
growth model, we have shown that, consistently with many empirical studies,
a rise in the core rate of inflation reduces the steady-state capital stock. The
resulting long-run welfare cost of inflation is larger than it would if impatience
is marginally increasing or constant. This implies that if actual impatience is
marginally decreasing as empirically reported, misspecifying it as marginally
increasing or constant as in the literature results in underestimating the long-
run welfare costs of inflation.
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Figure 1. Inflation and capital stock under decreasing marginal impatience 
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